South Korea is quietly engineering one of the most significant reversals in global energy policy. Less than five years after the Moon Jae-in government set the country on a course of nuclear phase-out — closing reactors, freezing new construction, and investing heavily in LNG imports — Seoul has executed a dramatic U-turn. Under President Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration and its successors, South Korea is not only restarting previously approved reactor projects but positioning itself as a leading exporter of nuclear technology to a world increasingly hungry for reliable, low-carbon electricity.
In 2026, South Korea’s nuclear programme is at a pivotal inflection point — one with significant implications for Asian electricity markets, global energy security, and the broader debate about which technologies can realistically anchor a post-carbon power system.
South Korea’s Nuclear Fleet: The Foundation
South Korea operates 26 commercial nuclear reactors at five sites along its coastlines, with a combined capacity of approximately 26.1 gigawatts (GW). These plants generated approximately 30–32% of South Korea’s total electricity in 2025 — a share that is poised to grow significantly as new construction comes online. The country’s electricity mix also includes substantial LNG (approximately 27%), coal (around 28%), and a growing renewables component (approximately 9%), with the government targeting 30% renewable electricity by 2030.
The flagship of South Korea’s nuclear programme is KEPCO’s APR-1400 reactor design — a pressurised water reactor that has demonstrated competitive performance metrics. The APR-1400 has a capacity factor (the share of time spent generating at full output) of over 80% at South Korean plants, and construction costs at domestic sites have been significantly lower than comparable Western projects, largely because of South Korea’s continuous construction programme and the resulting economies of scale and supply chain maturity.
The Policy U-Turn: From Phase-Out to Renaissance
The Moon administration’s 2017 nuclear phase-out policy was driven by public concern following the Fukushima disaster and a desire to transition toward renewables and natural gas. Under this policy, the government declined to extend the licences of ageing reactors, suspended the construction of two new APR-1400 units (Shin-Hanul Units 3 and 4), and set a trajectory toward zero nuclear by the 2080s.
The Yoon administration, elected in 2022, reversed course rapidly. Shin-Hanul Units 3 and 4 construction — suspended for five years — was formally recommenced, with the units now expected to begin commercial operation in the early 2030s. The government also announced its intention to extend the operating lives of South Korea’s existing reactor fleet, with several plants previously scheduled for retirement now set to continue operating under extended licences.
The policy reversal reflected both energy security concerns — highlighted by the global gas price shock of 2022 — and economic competitiveness arguments. South Korean manufacturers, particularly in the semiconductor and battery sectors, are among the world’s most electricity-intensive industries. Ensuring affordable, reliable baseload power is seen as a national economic imperative, not merely an environmental policy choice.
The AI and Data Centre Demand Surge
A powerful new driver has reinforced South Korea’s nuclear commitment: the explosive growth of artificial intelligence and data centre electricity demand. South Korea is home to Samsung, SK Hynix, and other semiconductor giants whose manufacturing facilities consume extraordinary quantities of electricity — in 2025, SK Hynix’s flagship Icheon campus alone consumed approximately 1.2 GW of power continuously, the equivalent of a medium-sized city.
The AI boom has turbocharged this trend. South Korean data centre capacity is expanding rapidly, with global cloud operators including AWS, Microsoft, and Google all building or expanding facilities in the country. Government projections suggest data centre electricity demand in South Korea could grow by 30–40% between 2025 and 2030, adding several gigawatts of new load that must be served by dependable, low-emission power.
This creates a natural alignment with nuclear power. Unlike solar and wind, nuclear plants generate electricity continuously regardless of weather conditions — precisely the characteristic demanded by 24/7 data centres and semiconductor fabs. The “clean, firm” nature of nuclear power has moved from a theoretical advantage to a practical commercial necessity in the eyes of tech-industry energy planners. For more context on AI’s growing energy footprint, see our analysis of China’s AI energy demands.
Small Modular Reactors: Korea’s Next Generation Bet
South Korea is not only doubling down on conventional large-scale nuclear but investing heavily in small modular reactor (SMR) technology. KEPCO and its subsidiary Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) are developing the SMART (System-integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor) — a 100 MW pressurised water SMR that received standard design approval from the Korean Nuclear Safety Commission in 2012, making it one of the world’s first SMRs to complete regulatory review.
An agreement signed with Saudi Arabia for the potential construction of two SMART units has attracted international attention, positioning South Korea as a first-mover in commercial SMR deployment. Meanwhile, Korean firms are participating in SMR development programmes in the United States, Poland, and the Czech Republic, recognising that the global SMR market could represent a substantial export opportunity across the 2030s and beyond.
South Korea’s SMR ambitions are backed by a government-funded research programme and a nuclear supply chain that — unlike those in the UK or US — has remained largely intact through decades of continuous construction. This institutional knowledge is a significant competitive advantage that countries attempting to restart nuclear programmes from scratch will struggle to replicate quickly.
Nuclear Exports: A Diplomatic and Economic Priority
The UAE’s Barakah nuclear power plant — four APR-1400 units built by a KEPCO-led consortium — stands as the most prominent demonstration of South Korea’s nuclear export capability. The first unit began commercial operation in 2021, with subsequent units following. Despite some construction delays, the project has broadly validated Korea’s ability to deliver a large nuclear project in a new market.
South Korea is actively pursuing further nuclear export contracts. Poland — which is building its first nuclear power programme — selected KHNP’s APR-1400 for its Pątnów site, with a framework agreement signed in 2022 and detailed work continuing through 2025–2026. The Czech Republic’s Dukovany expansion tender, in which KEPCO is competing, is another high-profile opportunity. South Korean government and industry have also engaged with a range of developing-world markets including the Philippines, Vietnam, and several African nations.
Nuclear exports carry significant strategic value beyond the immediate economic return. A country that builds your power plant also trains your nuclear engineers, supplies your fuel, and services your reactors for decades — creating deep and enduring economic and diplomatic ties. Seoul recognises this and has made nuclear export promotion a formal element of its foreign economic policy.
Electricity Prices and Consumer Impact
South Korean households benefit from some of the lowest retail electricity tariffs among developed nations, with residential prices averaging approximately 130–140 Korean Won (₩) per kWh in early 2026 — equivalent to roughly €0.09–€0.10/kWh, compared to €0.38–€0.42/kWh in Germany. This price advantage is largely attributable to the combination of nuclear baseload and government-owned Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) operating as a regulated utility with politically constrained pricing.
However, KEPCO has struggled financially due to the mismatch between its politically capped retail tariffs and its rising fuel costs — particularly during the 2022 gas price spike, when LNG imports became dramatically more expensive. The corporation accumulated significant losses in 2022–2023, requiring government financial support. The nuclear programme’s expansion is partly motivated by reducing this LNG exposure and restoring KEPCO’s financial sustainability over the medium term.
Industrial electricity prices, while somewhat higher than household rates, remain competitive by global standards — a critical advantage for South Korea’s export-oriented manufacturing economy. Maintaining this industrial price competitiveness is explicitly cited in government energy planning documents as a rationale for the nuclear expansion.
Safety, Waste and Public Acceptance
South Korea’s nuclear renaissance is not without its challenges. Public acceptance of nuclear power has been a persistent issue, with local communities near reactor sites occasionally mounting opposition to life extensions and new construction. Transparency in safety regulation — overseen by the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) — is essential to maintaining the social licence needed for continued expansion.
Nuclear waste management remains an unresolved challenge, as it does globally. South Korea has been attempting for decades to site a permanent high-level nuclear waste repository without success, as every proposed location has faced local opposition. Interim storage at reactor sites is approaching capacity limits at some facilities, creating urgency around the waste question. The International Energy Agency has highlighted waste management as one of the key policy challenges for countries pursuing nuclear expansion.
Conclusion: A Model for Others?
South Korea’s nuclear trajectory offers important lessons for a world wrestling with how to decarbonise electricity while maintaining reliability and industrial competitiveness. The country’s deep nuclear supply chain, its experience with large-scale construction, and its pragmatic reversal of the phase-out policy provide a contrast to Europe’s more ambivalent relationship with atomic power.
Whether Korea’s model is replicable elsewhere depends heavily on political will, regulatory capacity, and the ability to maintain the institutional knowledge that makes nuclear construction cost-effective. Countries starting from scratch — including many in Southeast Asia and Africa — face far steeper learning curves.
What is clear is that nuclear power’s place in the global energy mix is being reassessed across multiple continents, driven by the dual imperatives of energy security and deep decarbonisation. South Korea stands at the forefront of that reassessment, and its choices in the coming decade will shape both its own electricity market and the global nuclear industry’s prospects for decades to come. Those interested in the wider energy transition landscape should keep a close eye on Seoul’s next moves.
